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ABSTRACT 
Procyclicality in banking may result in financial instability and therefore be destructive to 
economic growth. The sensitivity of different banking balance sheet and income statement 
variables to the business cycle is diversified and may be prone to increasing integration of 
financial markets. In this paper we address the problem of the influence of financial 
integration on the transmission of economic shocks from one country to another and 
consequently on the sensitivity of loan loss provisions to the business cycle. We also aim to 
find out whether earnings management hypotheses are supported throughout the whole 
business cycle.  Application of the SURE approach to 13 OECD countries  in 1995-2009 
shows that the procyclicality of LLP is statistically significant almost in thewhole sample of 
countries. Independent of the econometric specification, the earnings management hypotheses 
are hardly supported.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A common explanation for the procyclicality of the financial system in general, and the 
banking sector in particular, has its roots in information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers. Some authors argue that the misperceptions of risk and inappropriate responses to 
changes in risk over time  constitute additional material source of financial procyclicality 
(Borio et al., 2001).  Procyclicality of financial variables is one of two potential sources of 
systemic risk (Borio, 2009:33; BOE, 2009:17). Excessive procyclicality may lead to 
excessively high systemic risk, and as experience of the last crisis suggests, to boom-bust 
cycles in the macro-economy (Borio and Zhu, 2012:246).  
Loan loss provisions normalized by average total assets or loans are usually applied in 
financial research to measure the level of credit risk (see e.g. Borio at al., 2001; Chen, 2007; 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Athanasoglou et al., 2009; Foos et al., 2010; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Haq and Heaney, 2012). If we consider this ratio in 
aggregated form, we obtain a tool which is usually applied in systemic risk analysis (e.g. by 
central banks) and cited in the early warnings indicators as well as macroprudential policy 
tools literature ( see e.g. BOE, 2009; IMF, 2011; CFGS, 2010; BIS, FSB and IMF, 2011;  
Borio and Drehman, 2009, p. 18; Gerdesmeier et a; 2009; Alessi and Detken, 2009; Espinoza 
et al., 2009; Galati and Moesner, 2010). This risk measure is documented to be procyclical, as 
it increases when economy is in downswings and decreases during economic upswings. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2007) 
and Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) have analyzed in an international sample of banks the 
relation between LLP and GDP growth and other variables. This research supports the 
procyclical behavior of LLP, as LLP are negatively related to GDP growth. The analysis of 
regressions run in those papers leads to the observation that LLP’s sensitivity to the economic 
cycle differs from regression to regression as well as from one set of countries to another. 
LLP may be utilized by banks for management objectives. At least three such 
objectives have been distinguished in the literature (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al., 
1999), i.e. income smoothing, capital management and risk management (Fonseca and 
González, 2008). Previous studies tested those hypotheses (with ambiguous results) using 
individual banks’ data spanning short horizons, which did not cover the whole business cycle. 
Consequently, it is not obvious if earnings management is a short or long-term phenomenon 
and whether it is likely to be detected with the application of national banking sectors data (as 
in Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). Therefore we ask whether determinants related to the 
respective hypotheses affect LLP formation in the anticipated way throughout a whole 
business cycle?  
Financial, and consequently economic, integration has increased dramatically over the 
past two decades. Increasing interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets, and 
more highly correlated financial risks intensified cross-border spillovers through many 
channels (see Claessens et al., 2010). Any shock to one of the integrated national markets, 
especially the U.S., is bound to have effects on other countries. But do shocks in any country 
analyzed in this paper influence the relation between LLP and its determinants in other 
countries? Previous research did not investigate this problem. We conduct our analysis with 
the aim of finding out whether linkages between countries affect the sensitivity of LLP to the 
business cycle and to other determinants of this risk measure.  
This paper studies the link between bank loan loss provisions and their determinants 
using balanced panel dataset for 13 OECD countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United States) 
over the period of 1995-2009. We test the heterogeneity in the strength of the relationship 
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between the real GDP changes to LLP across countries. Initially we apply country regression 
approach, commonly used in the literature. In this approach error terms are independent 
across countries, which makes the system of equation simple. In the next step we consider the 
SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations) approach, to test the impact of economic 
linkages between countries on the tested relationship. In the SURE model error terms specific 
to a particular country may be dependent on error terms involved in regression equations 
related to other countries. 
The main novelty of this paper lies in the analysis whether the economic and financial 
integration between countries affects the sensitivity of LLP to banking sector specific 
determinants as well as to the business cycle. By looking at how sensitivity of LLP to the 
business cycle (and its statistical significance) in one country changes in response to shocks in 
other countries we shed light on the problem of systemic risk spillovers. To the best of our 
knowledge we are the first to investigate this problem.  
We find that LLP are procyclical in most countries considered in our analysis. In contrast 
to independent regression OLS analysis, the application of the SURE approach shows that the 
procyclicality of LLP is statistically significant almost in the whole sample of countries. We 
find support for income smoothing hypothesis only in Spain, where dynamic provisioning 
regulations are in force.  Generally, we infer that regardless of the econometric specification, 
the earnings management hypotheses are hardly supported, even when the method of 
specification is accounted for.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2  discusses the hypotheses 
regarding determinants of loan loss provisions with particular focus on the increasing 
financial integration and its influence on the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle. Section 
3 describes the dataset and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and implications for further research. 
 
2. DETERMINANTS OF LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In the literature, loan loss provisions as a tool of earnings management,  are  usually expressed 
as a function of bank specific (internal), macroeconomic and country specific (external) 
determinants.  In our study the variables chosen as possibly explanatory of LLP  are those 
traditionally applied for the income smoothing hypothesis (see Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; 
Beatty et al., 2002; Liu and Ryan, 2006) modified by the inclusion of  business cycle 
measures (as in Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) (see Table 1).  
 
2.1. Bank determinants 
 
As banking sector specific determinants of loan loss provisions (i.e. net provisions normalized 
by average total assets) we use three variables representing three hypotheses applied in 
earnings management literature: profit, loans growth and capital.   
PROFIT is operating profit before provisions and taxes divided by total average assets 
(PROFIT/TA). The relation between this variable and LLP is applied to verify income 
smoothing hypothesis by banks.  If banks use LLP to smooth earnings, then we would expect 
a positive relationship between PROFIT and LLP. Empirical research on individual banks, 
both single and cross-country  confirms that this variable and LLP are positively related 
(Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; 
Liu and Ryan, 2006; Fonseca and González, 2008; and Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008). The 
higher the positive coefficient on PROFIT the more income smoothing there is. A negative 
impact of PROFIT on LLP suggests that banks do not apply LLP to smooth their earnings. 
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Loans growth is real growth of loans (∆Loans). Changes in total loans outstanding are 
related to changes in default risk (and also credit risk). If banks use LLP (i.e. their portion set 
aside to cover expected losses) to manage credit risk, then the relationship between LLP and 
∆Loans is positive. Otherwise, i.e. when banks show imprudent loan loss provisioning 
behavior, LOANSGROWTH exerts a negative impact on LLP. Empirical results on this 
relationship do vary. Some papers find positive influence of real loan growth on LLP (Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2005; Fonseca and González, 2008) implying that banks set aside 
provisions to cover risks which have built up during economic booms. Other studies 
document a negative coefficient on ∆Loans (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003) which implies the 
rejection of the hypothesis of prudent loan loss provisioning behavior.  
 
Table 1. Definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
 
Capital normalized by total assets (CAP/TA) is introduced to test the capital 
management hypothesis. The capital management hypothesis emphasizes the role of loan loss 
provisions in capital ratio variation. The relationship between CAP and LPP may be both 
negative and positive. If capital variation is more related to retained earnings than to loan loss 
reserves, as stipulated in many accounting standards, the CAP may exert a negative effect on 
LPP. Such negative coefficient on CAP is found by Ahmed et al. (1999) and Bikker and 
 
Variable Measure Notation Expected 
effect on 
LLP 
Dependent variable: 
Aggregated credit risk 
 
Net loan loss provisions divided by 
average total assets 
 
LLP 
  
Determinants:     
Banking sector 
specific: 
 
Income smoothing 
measure 
 
Risk management 
measure 
 
Capital management 
measure 
 
 
 
 
 
Profit before taxes and provisions to 
average total assets 
   
Real growth of loans to non-  
  financial customers  
 
   Capital to assets ratio. 
 
ܴܱܲܨܫܶ/ܶܣ 
∆ܮܱܣܰܵ 
ܥܣܲ/ܶܣ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
-/+ 
 
Macreconomic: 
 
Business cycle 
measure (real)   
 
Business cycle 
measure (prices)  
 
 
   
Real GDP growth 
 
 
Inflation (Consumer Prices Index) 
 
 
ܩܦܲܩ
 
ܫܰܨ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
+/- 
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Metzemakers (2005). On the other hand, if the capital level is more affected by the loan loss 
allowances set aside by banks, then the influence of CAP on LLP is positive. Indeed,    Liu 
and Ryan (2006) find a significantly positive coefficient on CAP, implying that better 
capitalized banks recorded charge-offs more quickly than poorly capitalized banks did. 
Shrieves and Dahl (2002) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) find a positive coefficient on CAP 
and suggest that this observation is in line with capital management hypothesis, as poorly 
capitalized banks increase their LLP to increase their capital base.  
 
 
 
2.2. Macroeconomic determinants 
 
We focus on two macroeconomic determinants of LLP: the GDPG and the INF. The GDPG is 
real GDP growth. GDPG as a control variable is included to control for the documented 
procyclical effect of provisioning. The ratio of relationship between LLP and GDPG is the 
most interesting variable in our study, as its sensitivity to the business cycle measures the 
procyclicality of  LLP. Empirical research shows that GDPG is negatively related to LLP 
(Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; 
Fonseca and González, 2008). The stronger the negative coefficient of GDPG, the more 
procyclicality there is. A positive association between LLP and GDP would suggest 
countercyclical provisions and therefore support the hypothesis of prudent loan loss 
provisioning behaviour of banks emphasized by Laeven and Majnoni (2003).  
INF is the inflation rate. We employ INF as an exogenous control variable. Inflation 
has been used as a determinant of LLP by Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009). Their study 
finds that the coefficient on the INF is positive, suggesting that LLP increase as consumer 
prices get higher. However, if the INF is considered as economic cycle variable, increasing in 
economic booms and decreasing during economic busts we might expect that this variable is 
negatively related to LLP, which would be consistent with the procyclicality hypothesis 
emphasizing that loan loss provisions decrease in economic upswings and increase in 
economic downswings. 
 
2.3. High integration of the financial system and its impact on systemic risk 
 
Financial and consequently economic integration has increased dramatically over the past two 
decades. This phenomenon results in capital account openness and financial market reforms 
and is present especially among OECD countries. In those countries it manifests itself in 
cross-border gross positions (Kool, 2010).  A number of resent papers show that financial 
integration may bring about indirect and catalytic growth (Kose et al., 2009). However, the 
last financial crisis reminds us of the risks of financial integration for both emerging and 
advanced economies (Obstfeld, 2009).  
Increasing interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets, and more highly 
correlated financial risks intensified cross-border spillovers through many channels (see 
Claessens et al., 2010). Any shock to one of the integrated national markets, especially the 
U.S. is bound to have effects on other countries. Using VAR models Helbing et al. (2011) 
find that credit shocks originating in the United States have a significant impact on the 
evolution of world growth during global recessions.  Credit (and sometimes other) shocks are 
events  characteristic of unstable financial systems (Borio and Drehmann, 2009). This 
instability of financial system leads to excessive levels of systemic risk. 
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Excessive levels of systemic risk, exemplified by past and recent crises, reveal a range 
of distortions which might result in risk across the financial system  rising above its socially 
optimal levels. Those distortions stem from market failures (BOE, 2009) as well as wrong 
responses by market participants to risks across time (Borio et al., 2001). These distortions 
propagate within the financial system and on to the real economy through two channels: 
leverage and maturity mismatch, both of which are features of banking activity. As is pointed 
out in the literature, in dealing with systemic risk, besides the leverage and maturity mismatch 
dimensions (BOE, 2009), two additional dimensions need to be considered: the cross-
sectional dimension (also called network risk) and the time series dimension (Borio, 2009). 
Whereas in the cross – section dimension the key issue is how risk is distributed across 
individual institutions at a given point in time, in the time dimension the most important  issue 
is how systemic risk can be amplified by interactions within the financial system as well as 
between the financial system and the real economy (for more see Borio, 2009). Procyclicality 
of financial variables, and in effect banking sector variables, is an example of the time 
dimension of systemic risk.  
Previous studies suggest that business and financial cycles do interact (Claessens et a., 
2012). These interactions are more prominent between credit and house price cycles (again 
implying a procyclicality of the financial system). Claessens et al. (2012) suggest that the 
empirical literature about important roles played by countries’ institutional structures and 
regulatory frameworks in shaping the interactions between business and financial cycles is 
still limited. Given the importance of these interactions, we conduct our analysis with the 
SURE estimation to find out whether linkages between individual countries do contribute to 
the procyclicality of credit risk.  
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
We use the aggregated yearly bank balance sheet and income statement data over the period 
of 1995-2009. This dataset is collected by OECD in a harmonized way which eliminates the 
effects of differences in statistical definitions and accounting and therefore allows meaningful 
comparisons across countries. We use information for national banking sectors in 13 
countries. The basic model reads as: 
                   
୐୐୔ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
	= 	 α୨,଴ + α୨,ଵ 	
୐୐୔ౠ,౪షభ
୘୅ౠ,౪ିଵ
+ 	α୨,ଶ∆GDPG୨,୲ 	+ 	 	α୨,ଷINF୨,୲ 	+ 	α୨,ସ	
୔ୖ୓୊୍୘ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
	+	α୨,ହ	∆Loans୨,୲ 	+
	α୨,଺	
େ୅୔ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
+ ε୨,୲,			 (I) 
 
where all variables are observed for j-th country (j=1,…,n) at year t=1,…,T. The dependent 
variable is the loan loss provision (LLP) of bank divided by this bank’s total assets (TA). The 
independent variables can be subdivided into two groups. In the first group we collect the 
macroeconomic variables, like annual growth of the real Gross Domestic Product (∆GDPG୨,୲) 
and the inflation rate (INF୨,୲). The second group of variables consist of various bank specific 
variables, like earnings before imposing LLP and taxes (
୔ୖ୓୊୍୘ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
), loans growth (∆Loans୨,୲), 
and capital ratio measured as share of capital in total assets (
େ୅୔ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
). The model also includes 
the first lag of the dependent variable to  capture adjustment costs that constrain the complete 
adjustment of LLP to an equilibrium level (see Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005 and Fonseca and González, 2008). All banking sector specific variables 
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are normalized by the bank total average assets (TA) to mitigate potential estimation 
problems with heteroscedasticity. 
Standard assumption that, for each t, Gaussian error terms ߝ௝,௧ and ߝ௜,௧ in (I) are 
uncorrelated if ݅ ≠ ݆, makes the system of equations (I) independent. We denote this case by 
M0. 
However, in general, error terms ߝ௝,௧ and ߝ௜,௧ 	can be correlated and the system (I) can be 
treated as falling under the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) model. We 
define this case as M1, while ߝ௧ = (ߝଵ,௧, … , ߝ௡,௧) stands for the vector of error terms at time t 
with the covariance matrix . In the case of model M1 the matrix  is symmetric and positive 
definite with n(n+1)/2 free elements (ߪ௜௝
ଶ), i=1,…,n and j=1,…,n, such that ߪ௜௝
ଶ = ߪ௝௜
ଶ. In the 
standard notation the variance of the error terms in the i-th country is denoted by ߪ௜௜
ଶ and the 
covariance between error terms in j-th and i-th country is denoted by ߪ௜௝
ଶ . We apply the 
following notation to the dependent variable and the vector of explanatory variables: 
ݕ௝,௧ =
௅௅௉ೕ,೟
்஺ೕ,೟
, ݔ௝,௧ = (1,
୐୐୔ౠ,౪షభ
୘୅ౠ,౪ିଵ
, ∆GDPG୨,୲, INF୨,୲,
୔ୖ୓୊୍୘ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
	 , ∆Loans୨,୲,
େ୅୔ౠ,౪
୘୅ౠ,౪
). 
The system of equations (I) can be formulated in the following closed form: 
ݕ(௝) = ݔ(௝)ߙ(௝) + ߝ(௝), j=1,…,n, 
where ݕ(௝) = (ݕ௝,ଵ, … , ݕ௝,்)′, ݔ(௝) = ൫ݔ௝,ଵ
ᇱ , … , ݔ௝,்
ᇱ ൯
ᇱ
,  ߝ(௝) = ൫ߝ௝,ଵ, … , ߝ௝,்൯
ᇱ
 and ߙ(௝) =
(ߙ௝,଴, ߙ௝,ଵ, … , ߙ௝,଺)′. In the next step we stack the observations presenting the system of 
equations as a regression of the following form: 
 
                                                                    Y = Xα + ߝ,                                                          (II) 
 
where [ܻ௡்௫ଵ] = (ݕ
(ଵ)ᇱ, … , ݕ(௡)
ᇲ
)′, ߝ[௡்௫ଵ] = (ߝ
(ଵ)ᇱ, … , ߝ(௡)
ᇲ
)′, ߙ[௡଻௫ଵ] = (ߙ
(ଵ)ᇱ, … , ߙ(௡)
ᇲ
)′ and: 
 
[ܺ௡்௫௡଻] =
⎝
⎜
⎛
ݔ(ଵ) 0[்௫଻]
0[்௫଻] ݔ(ଶ)
… 0[்௫଻]
… ⋮
⋮ ⋱
0[்௫଻] …
⋱ 0[்௫଻]
0[்௫଻] ݔ(௡) ⎠
⎟
⎞
. 
 
Simple calculations yield the following form of the covariance matrix for the error term ߝ in 
(II): 
V(ߝ) = Σ⨂ܫ௡, 
where  denotes the Kronecker product. The form of the covariance matrix of ߝ makes the 
system (II) a generalised linear regression. Given , the Aitken Generalised Least Squares 
estimator of all parameters in the system can be expressed in the following form: 
αෝ = (ܺ′(Σ⨂ܫ௡)ିଵܺ)ିଵܺ′(Σ⨂ܫ௡)ିଵݕ. 
In the M0case, where Σ = diag(ߪଵଵ
ଶ , … , ߪ௡௡ଶ ) we have: 
αෝ = αෝை௅ௌ = (ܺ′ܺ)ିଵܺ′ݕ, 
which is equivalent to the application of the OLS estimator to each equation separately. In the 
general case, M1, we have to estimate the covariance matrix . In the empirical part of the 
paper we apply the Zellner (1962) method, and estimate elements of matrix  on the basis of 
OLS residuals, denoted by ߝ[̂௡்௫ଵ] = (ߝ̂
(ଵ)ᇱ, … , ߝ̂(௡)
ᇲ
). The Estimated GLS, proposed by 
Zellner (1962) takes the following form: 
αෝாீ௅ௌ = (ܺ′(S⨂ܫ௡)ିଵܺ)ିଵܺ′(S⨂ܫ௡)ିଵݕ, 
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where: 
S =
ଵ
்
(ߝ̂(ଵ), … , ߝ̂(௡))′(ߝ̂(ଵ), … , ߝ̂(௡)). 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables applied in our study. Let us briefly 
highlight a few facts. On average, banking sectors in our sample have LLP of 0.327% over 
the entire period of 1995-2009. Of our two macroeconomic determinants, both show 
comparable mean levels, of over 2%. However, the INF is far more diversified across 
countries, with minimum and maximum values of -0.49% and 28.07%,  respectively. With 
regard to profit before taxes and provisions, the mean value is around 1.19%.The minimum 
and maximum values range between -0.77% and 3.98%. The mean loans growth is about 
6.23%, with a minimum value of -15.73% and maximum value of 44.9%. Finally,  the mean 
value of capital ratio is 5.99%. The minimum and maximum values range between 2.52% and 
11.05%.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of data 
 
 LLP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 ∆GDPG୨,୲ INF୨,୲ 
PROFIT୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 ∆Loans୨,୲ 
CAP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 
Mean 0.00327 2.2149 2.3974 0.011850 0.062273 0.059899 
Median 0.00278 2.4452 2.01667 0.011362 0.052095 0.056950 
Maximum 0.01792 7.0863 28.072 0.039758 0.44851 0.110483 
Minimum -0.00734 -5.6667 -0.49446 -0.007736 -0.15738 0.025217 
Std. Dev. 0.003193 2.1752 2.8142 0.006351 0.08620 0.01907 
Skewness 1.3 -1.1 5.9 1.2 0.8 0.5 
Kurtosis 6.79 5.35 46.67 6.19 5.27 2.52 
       
Jarque-Bera 171.90 83.26 16626.61 128.64 63.83 9.83 
Probability 0 0 0 0 1.38e-14 0.0073 
       
Sum 0.63697 431.91 467.49 2.3107 12.143 11.680 
Sum Sq. Dev. 0.001978 917.95 1536.4 0.007824 1.4415 0.07058 
       
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for variables 
 
 
LLP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 ∆GDPG୨,୲ INF୨,୲ 
PROFIT୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 ∆Loans୨,୲ 
CAP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 
LLP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 1      
∆GDPG୨,୲ -0.32*** 1     
INF୨,୲ 0.14** 0.34*** 1    
PROFIT୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 0.29** 0.41*** 0.60*** 1   
∆Loans୨,୲ -0.37*** 0.59*** 0.23*** 0.29*** 1  
CAP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 0.44*** 0.15** 0.28*** 0.77*** 0.09 1 
** denotes significance at 5% level; *** denotes significance at 1% level  
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Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the regression variables. The correlations 
indicate a statistically significant correlation between LLP and each of the explanatory 
variables. The correlation between LLP and real GDP growth is around 0.32 and is negative, 
suggesting procyclical behavior of banks’ loan loss provisioning. The correlation between 
LLP and inflation rate is positive and around 0.14, indicating procyclical behavior of banking 
sectors, as LLP increases with increasing inflation (and possibly with increasing nominal 
interest rates, which might make financing conditions of borrowers more costly, and therefore 
result in higher default risk (see e.g. Borio and Zhu, 2012)).  Correlation between LLP and 
profit before taxes and provisions is around 0.29, implying that banks do exercise income 
smoothing. The correlation between LLP and real loan growth is negative and quite strong 
(i.e. -0.37), suggesting imprudent risk management behavior. Finally, the correlation between 
our dependent variable and banking sector capital ratio is positive and stands around 0.44. 
Such correlation might support the capital management hypothesis.  
 
4.1. Results of net provisions sensitivity to determinants – independent regressions 
 
Table 4 presents the OLS estimation of the  loan loss provisioning model (M0), denoted by 
equation (I). The OLS regressions are run separately  for each country in the sample with the 
assumption that the error term in equation (I) in any particular country  is not correlated with 
error terms in the other countries. Such estimation treats the regression for each country 
separately, and ignores interactions among the equations, at the same time implying that there 
are no linkages between countries.  
Both macroeconomic determinants suggest procyclicality of LLP. In 10 countries the 
GDP growth coefficient is negative, with 5 countries exhibiting statistical significance of this 
coefficient. In 3 countries this coefficient is positive, but statistically insignificant. In line with 
expectations, the INF coefficient is almost always positive (i.e. in 12 out of 13 countries). 
However, it turns out to be statistically significant only in 2 countries.   
Concerning the banking sector specific determinants applied to test the three earnings 
management hypotheses, our results show that income smoothing hypothesis is rejected in 11 
countries, where the relationship between LLP and profit before taxes and provisions is 
negative. However, this relationship is statistically significant only in 5 countries. The income 
smoothing hypothesis is supported only in 2 countries, of which in one (i.e. Spain) the 
positive coefficient is statistically significant.  Our result is to some degree consistent with 
estimations obtained by Fonseca and González (2008, p. 224), who showed that income 
smoothing is a diversified phenomenon, and not in all countries it can be borne out.  
Loans growth as a proxy for risk management appears to be a positive determinant of 
LLP in 7 countries. Although the coefficient between LLP and loans growth is positive, this 
observation does not imply that banks practice prudent risk management, due to the fact that 
the coefficient on loans growth in each of those 7 countries is statistically insignificant.  We 
do not find support for imprudent risk management practices either, since the negative impact 
of loans growth in 6 countries is statistically insignificant as well.  
Finally, the capital to assets ratio is negatively related to LLP in 6 countries, with 2 
countries exhibiting a statistically significant relationship, and supports the capital 
management hypothesis predicting higher provisioning when the capital ratio is relatively 
low. In contrast, in 7 countries this relationship is positive, but only in 2 countries the 
coefficient on capital ratio is statistically significant.  In general, our results suggest that with 
independent OLS regression analysis capital management hypothesis is hardly supported. 
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series No 2/ 2013 
13 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of loan loss provisions in individual countries – the model M0 (independent 
regressions) 
  
LLP୨,୲ିଵ
TA୨,୲ିଵ
 ∆GDPG୨,୲ INF୨,୲ 
PROFIT୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 ∆Loans୨,୲ 
CAP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 Intercept 
Belgium 
estimates 0.5575 0.0003 0.0003 -0.2230 -0.0067 0.0206 0.0004 
std. error 0.3137 0.0002 0.0005 0.1185 0.0061 0.0519 0.0030 
t-stat 1.7770 1.1929 0.6585 1.8815 1.0940 0.3976 0.1458 
prob 0.1188 0.2718 0.5313 0.1019 0.3101 0.7028 0.8882 
Canada 
estimates -0.2254 -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0631 -0.0275 -0.2684 0.0195 
std. error 0.5338 0.0004 0.0008 0.2861 0.0153 0.2277 0.0134 
t-stat 0.4224 1.4296 0.9695 0.2206 1.7983 1.1790 1.4570 
prob 0.6854 0.1959 0.3646 0.8317 0.1152 0.2769 0.1885 
Denmark 
estimates 0.8630 -0.0012 0.0010 -0.5926 0.0066 0.1784 -0.0034 
std. error 0.2936 0.0003 0.0007 0.3015 0.0067 0.1513 0.0071 
t-stat 2.9399 3.6218 1.3576 1.9653 0.9767 1.1786 0.4876 
prob 0.0217 0.0085 0.2167 0.0901 0.3613 0.2771 0.6407 
France 
estimates 0.5719 -0.001 0.00005 -0.0109 0.0007 0.0106 0.0003 
std. error 0.1671 0.0001 0.0003 0.1403 0.0046 0.0794 0.0032 
t-stat 3.4232 0.9784 0.1775 0.0778 0.1473 0.1340 0.0996 
prob 0.0111 0.3604 0.8641 0.9402 0.8870 0.8971 0.9235 
Germany 
estimates -0.1308 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0643 -0.0041 0.2037 -0.0058 
std. error 0.3730 0.0004 0.0006 0.2662 0.0116 0.2214 0.0103 
t-stat 0.3507 0.6133 1.1465 0.2414 0.3507 0.9201 0.5635 
prob 0.7361 0.5590 0.2893 0.8161 0.7361 0.3881 0.5907 
Italy 
estimates 0.3236 -0.0007 0.0011 0.1518 0.0045 -0.1248 0.0077 
std. error 0.4246 0.0005 0.0007 0.2561 0.0225 0.1624 0.0143 
t-stat 0.7621 1.4906 1.4911 0.5928 0.2007 0.7686 0.5421 
prob 0.4709 0.1797 0.1796 0.5720 0.8467 0.4673 0.6046 
Netherlands 
estimates 0.5643 0.00002 0.0004 -0.4828 0.0014 0.0964 0.00002 
std. error 0.2615 0.0001 0.0002 0.0644 0.0017 0.0391 0.0010 
t-stat 2.1579 -0.1300 2.7229 7.5000 0.7817 2.4690 0.0197 
prob 0.0678 0.9002 0.0296 0.0001 0.4600 0.0429 0.9848 
Norway 
estimates 0.4162 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.9292 0.0070 0.2106 -0.0002 
std. error 0.2303 0.0005 0.0005 0.4297 0.0094 0.0970 0.0037 
t-stat 1.8072 2.1060 0.2309 2.1623 0.7443 2.1720 0.0468 
prob 0.1137 0.0732 0.8240 0.0674 0.4809 0.0664 0.9640 
Poland 
estimates 0.2218 -0.0017 0.0004 -0.4833 0.0023 -0.0587 0.0276 
std. error 0.2691 0.0007 0.0003 0.4043 0.0082 0.1692 0.0231 
t-stat 0.8242 2.5636 1.3388 1.1954 0.2773 0.3469 1.1947 
prob 0.4370 0.0374 0.2225 0.2708 0.7896 0.7388 0.2711 
Spain 
estimates -0.1237 -0.0006 0.0001 0.6212 -0.0034 0.0980 -0.0089 
std. error 0.1735 0.0001 0.0002 0.1486 0.0032 0.0352 0.0039 
t-stat 0.7132 5.7244 0.7960 4.1790 1.0660 2.7890 2.3109 
prob 0.4988 0.0007 0.4522 0.0411 0.3218 0.0270 0.0541 
Sweden 
estimates 0.2550 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0178 0.0018 -0.4159 0.0247 
std. error 0.2200 0.0002 0.0005 0.1852 0.0051 0.1125 0.0066 
t-stat 1.1588 2.3241 0.7887 0.0959 0.3598 3.6961 3.7214 
prob 0.2845 0.0531 0.4562 0.9263 0.7296 0.0077 0.0074 
Switzerland 
estimates 0.8840 0.0001 0.0041 -0.0871 -0.0025 -0.0929 0.0027 
std. error 0.3774 0.0009 0.0020 0.2756 0.0191 0.1727 0.0101 
t-stat 2.3420 0.1082 2.0089 0.3160 0.1305 0.5381 0.2627 
prob 0.0517 0.9169 0.0845 0.7612 0.8999 0.6072 0.8004 
US 
estimates 0.9235 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.5665 -0.0130 -0.0809 0.0221 
std. error 0.2217 0.0004 0.0004 0.0904 0.0111 0.0439 0.0061 
t-stat 4.1645 1.7023 0.4691 6.2671 1.1699 1.8409 3.6067 
prob 0.0042 0.1325 0.6533 0.0004 0.2803 0.1082 0.0087 
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: we present the results of OLS estimation of independent regressions of Eq. 
(I) of loan loss provisions and its determinants. Standard specification tests have also been conducted; R-squared 
(Adjusted R-squared, respectively) ranges from 0.566 (0.194) for Canada to 0.989 (0.979) for the US; 
Probability values for F-statistics (testing the hypothesis of statistical significance of the coefficients) range from 
0.297 (for Canada)  to  0.000 (for the US).  
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4.2. Economic and financial relations as the driving forces of LLP sensitivity to banking 
sector specific determinants and business cycle determinants – results from the 
SURE model 
 
In addition to the ordinary least squares (OLS) just described, we have also conducted  
seemingly unrelated regression estimates (SURE)  of equation (I) for each country. Table 5 
reports the SURE estimation of the  loan loss provisioning model (M1). As has been 
mentioned in the methodology section, the OLS treats the regression for each country 
separately and ignores interactions among the equations. The residuals (error terms) across 
countries are expected to be correlated, however, because countries’ systemic risks 
(exemplified in its default risk dimension by the level of LLP) are driven by many of the same 
macro-financial conditions highlighted in section 2 of this paper. SURE uses this information 
to estimate the system of equations more efficiently (Zellner, 1962). Although SURE requires 
an estimation of the covariance matrix of disturbances, the efficiency gain is likely to be large 
for at least two reasons cited in the literature (Greene, 2012, pp. 292-299). First, the error 
terms are likely to be highly correlated across countries, due to the interconnectedness of 
economic and financial systems. Second, the dimension of the covariance matrix (in our case 
13×13)  is smaller than the length of the time series (15 years). Indeed, Table 5 shows that the 
SURE estimation has improved the statistical significance of all coefficients.  
 The GDP growth coefficients range from -0.0014 for Poland to 0.0004 for 
Switzerland, and 11 out of the 13 estimates are negative, with 9 countries exhibiting statistical 
significance of the negative coefficients. In 2 countries this coefficient is positive, but only in 
one country  (Belgium) statistically significant. In line with expectations, the INF coefficients 
are almost always positive.  These coefficients range from -0.0002 for Sweden to 0.0037 for 
Switzerland, and 12 out of 13 estimates are positive. In 10 countries this determinant of LLP 
is statistically significant. The results therefore indicate that aggregated credit risk proxied by 
LLP is procyclical, and this feature of LLP is predominant if we account for cross country 
linkages estimated with the SURE method. Our result is consistent with estimations of 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) who, in an unbalanced panel of countries, found a negative 
relationship between LLP and real GDP growth and a positive association between LLP and 
inflation. 
The coefficients on profit before taxes and provisions range from -0.899 for Norway 
to 0.574  for Spain, with only 4 out of 13 estimates positive (and 1 estimation statistically 
significant, notably in the case of Spain where dynamic provisioning is implemented). In 6 
out of 9 countries with negative coefficients this estimation is statistically significant. This 
result, with the exception of Spain, suggests a rejection of income smoothing hypothesis in 
our sample of countries. Our estimations are to a certain extent consistent with the results 
obtained by Fonseca and González (2008, pp. 224) who showed that income smoothing is a 
diversified phenomenon. In their analysis the coefficients on profits before taxes and 
provisions range from -0.6804 for Colombia to 0.63 for Peru, with 12 out of 18 statistically 
significant estimates  positive. They also found that there is no statistically significant LLP – 
PROFIT relation in 21 other countries which were present in their research sample.  
Loans growth as a proxy for risk management appears to be a positive determinant of 
LLP in 6 countries, with only two coefficient statistically significant (for Denmark and 
Netherlands). This implies that SURE estimation increased the number of countries in which 
banks practice prudent risk management (from 0 in OLS independent regressions estimation 
to 2). Having said that we must admit that our estimation suggests rejection of prudent risk 
management in 2 countries, in which the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.  
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Table 5. Determinants of loan loss provisions in individual countries – the model M1 (SURE 
specification) 
 
  
LLP୨,୲ିଵ
TA୨,୲ିଵ
 ∆GDPG୨,୲ INF୨,୲ 
PROFIT୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 ∆Loans୨,୲ 
CAP୨,୲
TA୨,୲
 Intercept 
Belgium 
estimates 0.6217 0.0002 0.0004 -0.2241 -0.0042 0.0303 -0.0003 
std. error 0.1458 0.0001 0.0002 0.0584 0.0024 0.0231 0.0014 
t-stat 4.2657 2.2524 2.0136 3.8393 1.7641 1.3117 0.2001 
prob 0.0037 0.0590 0.0839 0.0064 0.1211 0.2310 0.8471 
Canada 
estimates -0.0052 -0.0004 0.0003 0.01573 -0.0165 -0.0978 0.0088 
std. error 0.2356 0.0002 0.0004 0.1201 0.0065 0.1058 0.0063 
t-stat 0.0222 2.2663 0.8033 0.1310 2.5549 0.9239 1.4049 
prob 0.9830 0.0578 0.4482 0.8995 0.0378 0.3563 0.2028 
Denmark 
estimates 0.8685 -0.0012 0.0011 -0.5308 0.0073 0.1667 -0.0038 
std. error 0.1144 0.0002 0.0004 0.1437 0.0031 0.0612 0.0028 
t-stat 7.5896 7.8207 2.8546 3.6942 2.3685 2.7237 1.3707 
prob 0.0001 0.0001 0.0245 0.0077 0.0497 0.0296 0.2128 
France 
estimates 0.5232 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0128 0.0006 0.0020 0.0005 
std. error 0.0762 0.00007 0.0001 0.0629 0.0015 0.0341 0.0014 
t-stat 6.8652 1.9547 1.0314 0.2042 0.3710 0.0582 0.3840 
prob 0.0002 0.0915 0.3367 0.8440 0.7216 0.9552 0.7124 
Germany 
estimates -0.1962 -0.0002 0.0008 0.1154 -0.0063 0.2850 -0.0103 
std. error 0.2039 0.0002 0.0003 0.1464 0.0062 0.1173 0.0055 
t-stat 0.9622 0.8986 2.4787 0.7883 1.0212 2.4287 1.8822 
prob 0.3680 0.3987 0.0423 0.4564 0.3411 0.0455 0.1018 
Italy 
estimates 0.2514 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0497 0.0003 -0.1666 0.0144 
std. error 0.2269 0.0003 0.0004 0.1422 0.0120 0.0821 0.0073 
t-stat 1.1078 2.0901 1.8345 0.3494 0.0218 2.0300 1.9832 
prob 0.3046 0.0750 0.1092 0.7370 0.9832 0.0819 0.0878 
Netherlands 
estimates 0.4780 -0.00008 0.0004 -0.4488 0.0017 0.1027 -0.0001 
std. error 0.1365 0.00006 0.00007 0.0372 0.0007 0.0191 0.00005 
t-stat 3.5020 1.2329 4.916 12.0563 2.3762 5.3656 0.2216 
prob 0.0100 0.2574 0.0017 0.000006 0.0492 0.0001 0.8310 
Norway 
estimates 0.4362 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.8991 0.0006 0.1350 0.0034 
std. error 0.1025 0.0002 0.0002 0.1743 0.0041 0.0490 0.0020 
t-stat 4.2552 3.4095 1.6490 5.1579 0.1492 2.7568 1.7029 
prob 0.0038 0.0113 0.1432 0.0013 0.8856 0.0282 0.1324 
Poland 
estimates 0.1806 -0.0014 0.0003 -0.4853 -0.0001 -0.0413 0.0259 
std. error 0.1295 0.0003 0.0001 0.1542 0.0040 0.0796 0.0096 
t-stat 0.1394 5.4068 2.2046 3.1469 0.0315 0.5184 2.6916 
prob 0.2058 0.0010 0.0633 0.0162 0.9757 0.6201 0.0310 
Spain 
estimates -0.0595 -0.0006 0.0002 0.5741 -0.0034 0.0794 -0.0074 
std. error 0.0907 0.00007 0.000097 0.0792 0.0020 0.0191 0.0022 
t-stat 0.6553 9.0745 2.3153 7.2491 1.7362 4.1556 3.4066 
prob 0.5332 0.00004 0.0538 0.0002 0.1261 0.0043 0.0113 
Sweden 
estimates 0.1658 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0295 0.0014 -0.3835 0.0228 
std. error 0.1134 0.0001 0.0003 0.0726 0.0026 0.0411 0.0027 
t-stat 1.4622 3.9732 0.9704 0.4065 0.5136 9.3228 8.3262 
prob 0.1871 0.0054 0.3642 0.6965 0.6233 0.00003 0.00007 
Switzerland 
estimates 0.9130 0.0004 0.0037 -0.2243 -0.0051 0.0491 0.0014 
std. error 0.1759 0.0003 0.0009 0.1566 0.0080 0.0656 0.0038 
t-stat 5.1900 1.3186 4.1233 1.4326 0.6394 0.7485 0.3766 
prob 0.0013 0.2288 0.0044 0.1951 0.5429 0.4785 0.7176 
US 
estimates 1.0025 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.5858 -0.0121 -0.0594 0.0195 
std. error 0.0853 0.0001 0.0001 0.0368 0.0036 0.0187 0.0021 
t-stat 11.7595 3.5701 1.9814 15.9021 3.3575 3.1830 9.4470 
prob 0.000007 0.0091 0.0880 0.00000009 0.0121 0.0154 0.00003 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series No 2/ 2013 
16 
 
The above result is consistent with findings of Laeven and Majnoni (2003), who found 
negative statistically significant results in most countries included in their research sample. 
Interestingly, the two countries in our sample in which banking sectors exhibit imprudent risk 
management practices include Canada and the US.  In the light of the last financial crisis 
especially the US case is of huge interest and we are of the opinion that it is worth reflecting 
on in slightly more detail. Considering this imprudent risk management in the US combined 
with the fact that the US financial assets represent around 31 percent of global financial assets 
as well as the U.S. dollar share in reserve currency assets of central banks around the world  is 
62 percent, it shouldn’t be surprising that US banking sector is prone to credit risk shocks 
which spread across the borders through the interconnected financial sector. 
Finally, the capital to assets ratio coefficients range from -0.38355 for Sweden to 
0.28495 for Germany,  and 8 out of the 13 estimates are positive, with coefficients exhibiting 
statistical significance in 4 countries. In 5 countries this coefficient is negative, but only in 3 
countries  (Italy, Sweden and the US) it is statistically significant. Our SURE estimation has 
increased the number of countries in which the capital management hypothesis is supported. 
Notwithstanding this inference, it is worth noting that the sample of countries in which the 
capital management hypothesis is rejected is larger as well after application of the SURE 
method.  No capital management is found in Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden. Nevertheless, we think that this conclusion should not be drawn without a certain 
reserve.  Specifically, loan loss provisioning practices are far from universal, as there is no 
uniformity among countries in setting the standards for classifying loans and provisioning 
(see Barth et al., 2006, pp.130-131). This lack of uniformity also relates to the rules of 
inclusion of provisions in the capital base. For example, in Spain banks are obliged to include 
the statistical provision in the capital base, consequently the relationship between provisions 
and capital is positive. Such a relationship in this case might as well be interpreted as 
evidence for prudent capital management behavior.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
This paper uses a balanced panel database of aggregated banking sector financial statements 
information in 13 countries to analyze determinants of credit risk in years 1995-2009. We 
proxy aggregated credit risk by loan loss provisions ratio and consider as explanatory 
variables determinants traditionally applied to test earnings management in firms. We conduct 
our analysis with  two objectives in mind. First, we aim to find out whether variables which 
usually affect loan loss provisions in individual banks are important determinants of national 
banking sectors LLP for extended time period covering 15 years. Second, we would like to 
check whether increasing interconnectedness of financial markets and real economies among 
countries makes both the procyclicality of LLP and earnings management more predominant. 
To answer those two questions we apply independent OLS regression estimates and SURE 
estimation. 
Generally, we infer that regardless of the econometric specification, the earnings 
management hypotheses are hardly supported. This conclusion notwithstanding, we must 
admit that we find support for income smoothing hypothesis in Spain, where dynamic 
provisioning regulations are in force.  In only 2 countries out of 13 we find support for 
prudent risk management. SURE estimation has increased the number of countries in which 
the capital management hypothesis is supported. 
 Our results indicate that aggregated credit risk proxied by LLP is procyclical, and this 
feature of LLP is predominant if we account for cross country linkages estimated with the 
SURE method. We proxy the cross country linkages by correlations between error terms of 
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independent OLS regressions conducted separately for each country in the sample. The error 
terms include information which is not accounted for by explanatory variables included in our 
econometric model, e.g. information on interconnectedness of financial markets and real 
markets.  
Our research contributes to the ongoing debate on measures of systemic risk in its time 
series dimension. By looking at how relationship (and its statistical significance) of LLP to 
the business cycle in one country changes in response to shocks other countries we shed a 
light on the problem of systemic risk spillovers. To the best of our knowledge we are the first 
to investigate this problem. 
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